Revolution is in the Air: 4/17/11: False pretense for war in Libya?

INDEX

The WikiLeaks News & Views Blog—Special Weekend Edition!

from The Nation Blogs: Media Fix by Greg Mitchell
EVENTS
IMPERIALISM IN WORD & DEED

False pretense for war in Libya?

Boston Globe: April 14, 2011 |By Alan J. Kuperman
HISTORY & ANALYSIS

Headlines for April 15, 2011

from Democracy Now! | Healthcare Reform by mail@democracynow.org (Democracy Now!)

The WikiLeaks News & Views Blog—Special Weekend Edition!

from The Nation Blogs: Media Fix by Greg Mitchell
EVENTS

Yemeni Women: “We Will not be Silent!”

from Informed Comment by Juan

Oh no he di’n’t!

Thousands of Yemeni women demonstrated against President Ali Abdullah Saleh on Saturday in Sanaa and Taizz, saying “We will not be silent!” They were protesting his complaint on Friday that there was gender mixing in the public rallies, which he said was contrary to Muslim culture, and his call for them to remain home. The activist women charged him with impugning their honor by suggesting that they were behaving inappropriately in public, and some filed a libel suit against him. Others just came out with extra fervor for the demonstrations.

The women protesters tend to wear the niqab, or the sort of full face covering recently banned in France, and they march together, so that they are in fact observing the norms for women coming in public in conservative Arabian societies. Only hard line fundamentalists advocate women’s seclusion, i.e. staying home most of the time, and Saleh had never been in that camp.

It is ironic that Saleh should try to send the women home, since his relatively secular Arab nationalist regime had lukewarmly adopted a project that my colleague Deniz Kandiyoti at SOAS in London has called “state feminism.” (See also Margot Badran). This developmentalist vision involves improving women’s literacy, education, and employment opportunities on the grounds that they are a resource for the state as it brings its people into modernity. Under Saleh’s government, which has devoted less practical energy and funding to state feminism than lip service, there nevertheless have been substantial improvements in women’s literacy– even though girls’ enrollment in school in rural areas is still low. ( 81% of young Yemeni women have an an elementary school education or less, while only 17% have a high school degree.) Of course, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, in the south (1967-1990), the Arab world’s only Communist regime during the Cold War, was a much more vigorous proponent of state feminism, though the project mainly affected the cosmopolitan port city of Aden, and it collapsed with unification in the 1990s, when the more conservative ways of the north were imposed on the south.

Saleh’s attempt to shoo the women back home was an uncharacteristic appeal to Muslim fundamentalist rhetoric, and perhaps an attempt to sow divisions between the fundamentalists and the women and their centrist or secularist supporters. It is an illustration of how secular Muslim leaders have often appealed to Islam in a cynical and instrumentalist way when it has suited them. (It is also a further illustration of the limitations of state feminism, which is, despite its rhetoric, patronizing and patriarchal.)

Aljazeera English has video on the women’s protests:

Like Israel

My source in Bahrain sent this to me under the headline “Israeli tactics in Bahrain“: demolishing an “unauthorized” mosque in Bahrain while Saudi/Bahraini troops stood by. (thanks anonymous)

Egypt’s Ruling Party Dissolved

from Informed Comment by Juan

A special administrative high court in charge of ruling on Egyptian political party affairs on Saturday declared the former ruling party, the National Democratic Party, to be defunct.

For Egypt, a major opinion leader in the Arab world and a country with a fourth of all Arabs, to move to multi-party democracy is a world-historic development and likely to be influential in the rest of the region.

The venerable Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, which was for decades a mouthpiece of the NDP, points out that the court did not so much dissolve the party as recognize that it had been effectively dissolved by events. The ruling said that former President Hosni Mubarak had been the head of the party, and when he was overthrown by the “glorious Egyptian Revolution” on February 11, the party ceased to exist. Its property and assets were ordered confiscated by the state. Its former leaders, the Mubarak family, are in jail or under arrest.

The step was a concession by the military government to the protest movement, which had demanded both that Hosni Mubarak be put on trial and that his party be dissolved. Democracy advocates had been afraid that the NDP, with its experience in organizing for elections (though admittedly fixed ones), might dominate the parliamentary races next September. As AP notes, there was violence last weekend between army and protesters, and the military has been attempting to appease the latter while maintaining a firm grip on power ahead of the September elections.

The Egyptian protesters’ demand that the NDP be dissolved was inspired in part by the achievement of the Tunisian reform movement, which had convinced the Tunisian elite to take a similar step with regard to the Rally for Constitutional Democracy, the one-party state erected around dictator Zine El Abedin Ben Ali.

Given that the Muslim Brotherhood, the other organized party in Egypt, has pledged to limit itself to contesting only a third of seats in parliament, and given that in any case it is not being allowed by the military to run formally because it is based on religion, the dissolution of the NDP probably opens up possibilities for smaller parties to do well in the elections. Likely the result will be a patchwork quilt of small parties, who will have to cobble together a ruling coalition, as has often happened in other parliamentary systems, such as Italy’s.

The National Democratic Party run by Mubarak had been founded by his predecessor, Anwar El Sadat, in 1978 when Sadat began allowing the phony parliamentary elections after 26 years of military dictatorship. The officers who had come to power in a coup in 1952 had dissolved the former longstanding ruling party, the Wafd, which had become corrupt and represented mainly the interests of the big hacienda owners. The officers then lacked a grassroots organization that connected them to the people.

Abdel Nasser thus founded a would-be party, the Liberation Rally, which ultimately evolved into the Arab Socialist Union. That party was abolished by Sadat in 1978, since it had been strongly associated with Nasser and with, well, socialism, whereas Sadat wanted to be his own man and wanted to take Egypt to the right. He opened the country up to investment and international finance, moved close to the United States, and made peace with Israel. So the National Democratic Party was to be the tool of a turn from socialism and Arab nationalism toward Neoliberalism avant la lettre. As the succeeding Mubarak regime privatized state enterprises and became increasingly corrupt and authoritarian, it gave the NDP a worse and worse name as an assembly of corrupt Mubarak cronies. And so its three decades of success spelled its ultimate doom, just as three decades of success had doomed the big-landlord Wafd Party before it.

Aljazeera English has a video news report:

Arab Spring Protests Continue

from Informed Comment by Juan

1. Syria: In the biggest day of protests in Syria so far, tens of thousands of Syrians demonstrated against the Baathist state of Bashar al-Asad on Friday. Large crowds came out in the Douma suburb of Damascus, but were prevented by the tear-gas and the batons of the Syrian police from reaching the center of the capital. In the southern city of Deraa, which has been the epicenter of Syrian unrest, 20,000 are said to have rallied against the government. Crowds also chanted in the streets against the government in Latakia, Homs, Banias and Jassan, as well as in the Kurdish areas. There were few casualties on Friday in Syria, which AP suggests may have reflected a regime strategy to minimize deaths of protesters.

Reuters has video, including disturbing scenes of Syrian police beating supine handcuffed prisoners with batons.

2. Yemen: Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis demonstrated throughout the country, in Sanaa, Taizz, Hudeida and Ibb. The biggest rally was in Taizz, where Yemeni security forces fired on the crowd and wounded eight demonstrators. In the capital of Sanaa, there were dueling demonstrations of supporters of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his detractors, but the pro-government protest was smaller and only comes out for a short period every Friday afternoon. In the rest of the country, large anti-Saleh crowds were the only ones in the streets. The opposition said mid-week that it was setting a two-week deadline for Saleh to step down.

Aljazeera English reports:

3. Aljazeera Arabic is reporting a demonstration in downtown Baghdad demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nouri al-Malliki. It alleges that large crowds came out in the northern city of Mosul to demand the immediate withdrawal of US troops.and the release of political prisoners. The Baghdad demonstration was probably Sadrists, Shiite followers of cleric Muqtadaal-Sadr. The one in the northern, largely Sunni Arab city of Mosul reflects ethnic discontents with the Shiite- and Kurdish-dominated government the US brought to the country, and the widespread lack of due process or speedy trials for Sunni Arabs taken into custody by Iraqi troops, some of whom have a background in Shiite militias.

4. In Amman, Jordan, 1000 or so dissidents gathered downtown Friday to demand the resignation of the prime minister and greater democratic freedoms. In the nearby city of Zarqa, a small demonstration of about 400 was mounted by the Salafis or Muslim fundamentalists, some of them followers of Abu Musab Zarqawi, the notorious terrorist. They were attacked by a counter-demonstration supporting the king.

5. Saudi Arabia: Altogether about a thousand protesters rallied in the eastern Saudi city of Qatif and in the nearby village of Awamiyya. They were protesting the crackdown on Shiite crowds in Bahrain, their own lack of religious freedom, and also the continued detention of protesters arrested during earlier. Police watched them closely but did not crack down.

6. The Bahrain government has backed off its plan to dissolve the Wifaq Party and one other. Wifaq is the largest Shiite party in the small Arab sheikhdom, representing the some 60% of the citizen population that is Shiite. It was gerrymandered into only having 18 of the 40 seats in the elected lower house, however. Its members resigned en masse to protest the use of violence by the regime against protesters. The protest movement, which was not wholly Shiite, had sought democratic reforms in Bahrain, though some small parties did call for the overthrow of the Sunni king, an absolute monarch. It is thought that American pressure caused the government to rethink its plan to ban Wifaq.

Against the House of Saud

Tunisians protest outside the Saudi embassy in Tunis. (thanks Jamal)
IMPERIALISM IN WORD & DEED

OP-ED | Alan J. Kuperman

April 14, 2011|By Alan J. Kuperman
(Getty Images)

EVIDENCE IS now in that President Barack Obama grossly exaggerated the humanitarian threat to justify military action in Libya. The president claimed that intervention was necessary to prevent a “bloodbath’’ in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city and last rebel stronghold.

But Human Rights Watch has released data on Misurata, the next-biggest city in Libya and scene of protracted fighting, revealing that Moammar Khadafy is not deliberately massacring civilians but rather narrowly targeting the armed rebels who fight against his government.

Misurata’s population is roughly 400,000. In nearly two months of war, only 257 people — including combatants — have died there. Of the 949 wounded, only 22 — less than 3 percent — are women. If Khadafy were indiscriminately targeting civilians, women would comprise about half the casualties.

Obama insisted that prospects were grim without intervention. “If we waited one more day, Benghazi … could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.’’ Thus, the president concluded, “preventing genocide’’ justified US military action.

But intervention did not prevent genocide, because no such bloodbath was in the offing. To the contrary, by emboldening rebellion, US interference has prolonged Libya’s civil war and the resultant suffering of innocents.

The best evidence that Khadafy did not plan genocide in Benghazi is that he did not perpetrate it in the other cities he had recaptured either fully or partially — including Zawiya, Misurata, and Ajdabiya, which together have a population greater than Benghazi.

Libyan forces did kill hundreds as they regained control of cities. Collateral damage is inevitable in counter-insurgency. And strict laws of war may have been exceeded.

But Khadafy’s acts were a far cry from Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Bosnia, and other killing fields. Libya’s air force, prior to imposition of a UN-authorized no-fly zone, targeted rebel positions, not civilian concentrations. Despite ubiquitous cellphones equipped with cameras and video, there is no graphic evidence of deliberate massacre. Images abound of victims killed or wounded in crossfire — each one a tragedy — but that is urban warfare, not genocide.

Nor did Khadafy ever threaten civilian massacre in Benghazi, as Obama alleged. The “no mercy’’ warning, of March 17, targeted rebels only, as reported by The New York Times, which noted that Libya’s leader promised amnesty for those “who throw their weapons away.’’ Khadafy even offered the rebels an escape route and open border to Egypt, to avoid a fight “to the bitter end.’’

If bloodbath was unlikely, how did this notion propel US intervention? The actual prospect in Benghazi was the final defeat of the rebels. To avoid this fate, they desperately concocted an impending genocide to rally international support for “humanitarian’’ intervention that would save their rebellion.

On March 15, Reuters quoted a Libyan opposition leader in Geneva claiming that if Khadafy attacked Benghazi, there would be “a real bloodbath, a massacre like we saw in Rwanda.’’ Four days later, US military aircraft started bombing. By the time Obama claimed that intervention had prevented a bloodbath, The New York Times already had reported that “the rebels feel no loyalty to the truth in shaping their propaganda’’ against Khadafy and were “making vastly inflated claims of his barbaric behavior.’’

It is hard to know whether the White House was duped by the rebels or conspired with them to pursue regime-change on bogus humanitarian grounds. In either case, intervention quickly exceeded the UN mandate of civilian protection by bombing Libyan forces in retreat or based in bastions of Khadafy support, such as Sirte, where they threatened no civilians.

The net result is uncertain. Intervention stopped Khadafy’s forces from capturing Benghazi, saving some lives. But it intensified his crackdown in western Libya to consolidate territory quickly. It also emboldened the rebels to resume their attacks, briefly recapturing cities along the eastern and central coast, such as Ajdabiya, Brega, and Ras Lanuf, until they outran supply lines and retreated.

Each time those cities change hands, they are shelled by both sides — killing, wounding, and displacing innocents. On March 31, NATO formally warned the rebels to stop attacking civilians. It is poignant to recall that if not for intervention, the war almost surely would have ended last month.

In his speech explaining the military action in Libya, Obama embraced the noble principle of the responsibility to protect — which some quickly dubbed the Obama Doctrine — calling for intervention when possible to prevent genocide. Libya reveals how this approach, implemented reflexively, may backfire by encouraging rebels to provoke and exaggerate atrocities, to entice intervention that ultimately perpetuates civil war and humanitarian suffering.

Alan J. Kuperman, a professor of public affairs at the University of Texas, is author of “The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention’’ and co-editor of “Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention.’’

All is well in Saudi-US relations

“Saudi officials say that despite the current friction in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, they won’t break out of the traditional security arrangement with Washington, which is based on the understanding that the kingdom works to stabilize global oil prices while the White House protects the ruling family’s dynasty. Washington has pulled back from blanket support for democracy efforts in the region. That has bruised America’s credibility on democracy and reform, but it has helped to shore up the relationship with Riyadh.” (thanks Ora)

US funds democracy in the Middle East

“Richard Genaille, deputy director of the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, said that two of the biggest deals on the table have been cleared to proceed: a $29.4 billion sale of 84 Boeing Co F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia and a $7 billion sale to the United Arab Emirates of an advanced missile defense system built by Lockheed Martin Corp.”

Obama on the Emir of Qatar

“”Pretty influential guy,” Obama said of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, noting that he basically owns the Al Jazeera television network. “He is a big booster, big promoter of democracy all throughout the Middle East. Reform, reform, reform — you’re seeing it on Al Jazeera.” But Obama: “Now, he himself is not reforming significantly. There’s no big move towards democracy in Qatar. But you know part of the reason is that the per capita income of Qatar is $145,000 a year. That will dampen a lot of conflict.” Having banished the press pool from a q-and-a session with the donors, Obama did not realize he was still speaking on an open mike. Mark Knoller of CBS News recorded his comments.” (thanks FLC)

Wael Ghonim blasts Western financial institutions

“”To me what was happening was a crime, not a mistake,” he said. He branded the international institutions and the “elites” of the world “partners in crime” in supporting Mubarak’s regime.
HISTORY & ANALYSIS

Aljazeera and the Qatari-Saudi conflict

The secret of the emergence of Aljazeera was not only in novelty and originality and pioneering effort: it lies in the Saudi-Qatari conflict with raged when Aljazeera first emerged. The Saudi-Qatari conflict was the best thing that ever happened to Aljazeera and served its early years because it expanded its horizons and its scope of criticisms. The decline of Aljazeera began when the Saudi royals made up with the Qatari royals. That severely narrowed the limitations of speech. I have heard many complaints from hosts of Aljazeera about the terrible impact of the Saudi-Qatari reconciliation on their coverage and programming. Now what happened recently is worse: the Saudi-Qatari reconciliation was transformed into a solid alliance (although the royal families of both countries hate one another). So the limits on freedoms of expressions are now severe and only criticisms of countries that are not on good terms with Saudi royals would be allowed. But of course the absence of the competition and the quality of the competition (think of the lousy news station of King Fahd’s brother-in-law, Al-Arabiyyah) will translate into commercial but not political success for Aljazeera.

My New Article on Sectarianism in the Arab World

Originally published in http://www.jadaliyya.com

Part 1 is Here and Part 2 is Here

On 22 March, Sha‘lan Sharif wrote an article in the spirit of Jonathan Swift’s “A Modest Proposal,” in al-Akhbar, the Arab world’s leading leftist newspaper. Sharif compared “the Jewish question” in pre holocaust Europe to the “Shiite question” of today. Jews were accused of conspiring against Europe, and against mankind throughout the ages, like rats carrying the plague, according to the Nazis. Just as Jews could not be trusted so too Shiites were accused of taqiyya, or dissimulation to conceal their “true intentions”.

While Sharif’s analogy might sound extreme, he was correct in observing an increase of hatred of Shiites throughout the Sunni Arab world. While there was never perfect harmony, there is also no history of civil war between Sunnis and Shiites until the American invasion of Iraq, nor anything resembling the international mobilization of sectarianism through media and statements of politicians and clerics. But since the American occupation of Iraq created a bloody civil war, relations between Sunnis and Shiites in the region have deteriorated to the point where if you meet a stranger the first thing you want to find out if he is Sunni or Shiite. Since the Saudi invasion of Bahrain, tensions on this issue have escalated more than ever before.

Sharif explained that the Jews of Europe in the previous century were not to be trusted. If they showed love they hated, if they showed attachment to the nation they were traitors, for how could they be trusted if they had killed Christ? Europeans asked how they could feel safe when among them lived the Jews who were traitors, conspirators and the murderers of Christ. None of the solutions offered to the Europeans reassured them, not even the Balfour Declaration, which promised a Jewish homeland outside of Europe, because, as Sharif wrote, “what guaranteed that the Jews would not conspire against us from their new homeland?”

“It needed a radical, final, solution, and God gave Europeans a courageous leader called Adolf Hitler who decided to put an end to the fifth column, Trojan horse, the villain, the eternal Jew. The final solution, the idea is simple: look for all the Jews in Europe: house to house street to street and kill them one by one, burn them en masse in gas chambers. And then there will be no Jewish question.”

“And we the Arabs? Our problem resembles the European problem of the last century. We have a people who resemble the Jews of Europe. They are called Shiites. They practice something calledtaqiyya, they reveal the opposite of what is in their hearts. Never trust them. Not even if they were martyred for the sake of the nation, and even if they fought against their enemies, they do so for taqiya. These alien people are called Shiites. They appear to be Arab but for some unclear reason they hate Arabs. They are really Persian. They conspire against Arabs. They hate the nations they were born in. Strange people indeed!”

“Look for example what they are doing now in Bahrain: They are demonstrating peacefully! Don’t believe them, this is taqiyya. Did you see them when we sent groups of thugs armed with knives, clubs and hunting rifles? They did not respond with a violent counterattack. Don’t believe them. This is taqiyya. While Sunni mosque sermons threatened doom and destruction, against “the Shiite Safavid conspiracy” and warned against the “sectarian agenda” of the demonstrators. They respond with the slogan of national unity, but this is taqiyya. Did you see how sectarian are these Shiites? And how much they hate Bahrain? While they hated they carried the flags of Bahrain during the demonstrations. They are adept at dissimulation to the degree they deceived all the American ambassadors in Manama, as well as the U.S. envoy who was sent by Washington. We know that these Shiites are puppets moved by Iranian fingers. But all American diplomats were unable to see it. They say that Iran does not play a role in the Shiite protests in Bahrain! Did you see how thetaqiyya deceived the Americans?”

“We Arabs will not have peace as long as they live among us, these sectarian Shiites. There must be a final solution. There must be courageous and bold leader like Hitler. Yes, we had a bold and courageous leader, his name is Saddam Hussein. He threw half a million Shiites on the border, and buried half a million others in mass graves. But we Arabs betrayed him, even though betrayal is not our habit but the habit of Shiites!”

“We opened our doors to the American invaders to make his regime fall, they handed him over to the Shiites, who killed him on Eid al-Adha! But we will take revenge on the Shiites of Bahrain for our sins against Saddam Hussein. Those who are demonstrating peacefully. We have run out of patience with them. Our thugs beat their youth, women and children, attack them with clubs in the university and the hospital. Our armed mercenaries roam their residential neighborhoods and break their shops. And they shout unity and national unity. How spiteful are they! We have run out of patience.”

“Oh my God, how much they hate Bahrain. This is their nature, they hate any country where they live. They are an alien people these Shiites. I have run out of patience. We have to begin the final solution! The Forces of “Peninsula Shield” will pursue them house to house, street to street, Glory to the Arab Hitler!”

Important as the popular revolutions sweeping the region are, they may come to be overshadowed by sectarian violence, and this may suit the aging Saudi royals, who carry what amounts to the Sunni flag. The reactionary Saudi monarchy won its cold war against Arab nationalists such as Egypt’s Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser from the 50s to the 70s. The result was an increase in Saudi dominance over the production of culture and media in the Arab world. Arab progressives and leftists suffered while fundamentalists flourished. This helps explain the weakness of Arab secular leftists to this day. With the death of Nasserist nationalism the only regional competition for influence was Iran. Post revolutionary Iran challenged the Saudi and American order. While Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdallah of Jordan and the Saudis collaborated with Israeli and American regional hegemony, Shiite Hizballah challenged this accommodation, exploding the myth of Israeli might and winning the love of millions of Arabs for its resistance to Israeli and American imperialism. Its leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah became the most popular leader in the Arab world for his charismatic and candid speeches. Iran also supported Hamas and resistance to Israel’s occupation and slow ethnic cleansing of the remaining Palestinians.

While so called moderate Sunni dictators had sold out on all the causes Arabs cared about, Iran seemed to be stealing the flag of Arab nationalism. Sunni dictators had to undermine Hizballah after its 2006 victory in Israel’s war on Lebanon. They played the sectarian card, warning about a Shiite crescent, calling Arab Shiites a fifth column and warning about the threat of Shiitification. Assassinated Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri was recreated into a Sunni symbol for sectarian agitation, as was Saddam Hussein, conveniently executed by Shiites. The American occupation of Iraq pitted Shiites against Sunnis, creating a brutal civil war which brought in hundreds of Arab suicide bombers who wanted to kill Shiites. Iraq was now controlled by sectarian Shiites. In 2006 the Saudis warned that they might intervene to protect Iraq’s Sunnis. In 2007 a senior Egyptian foreign ministry official told me the reason his country didn’t want to accept more Iraqi refugees was because they did not want to change Iraq’s “character” (i.e. by depleting it of its Sunnis). Hizballah was ascendant. Iran was confident, knowing Saddam was gone and the Americans were embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time the Bush administration contributed to regional sectarianism, seeking to bolster the so-called “moderate Sunni regimes” (dictatorships like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia viewed as moderate because they collaborated with Israel and the United States) against Iran or Hizballah.

While Shiites of Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and other countries each had their own nationalism and interests, the myth of a Shiite revival and crescent became easy to spread. In Lebanon, clashes erupted as the American- and Saudi-backed Sunni Future movement provoked the Iranian-backed Hizballah, leading to the 2008 humiliation of Sunni militiamen. Israel’s war on Gaza later that year and the obvious farce of a peace process also made a return to resistance an appealing option, as the American- and Saudi-backed Palestinian Authority was shown to be little more than collaborators with Israel and had failed to produce anything in return for their betrayal of the national liberation cause.

In January 2010 after a Hizballah coalition with other Sunnis, Shiites and Christians outmaneuvered the Saudi backed Sunni Future movement, Sunni extremists rioted in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli. When the humiliated caretaker Prime Minister Sa‘d Hariri spoke at a 14 March rally, a massive poster of Saudi king Abdallah was erected on the walls of the church behind him. It was ironic given Hariri’s movement stated opposition to foreign intervention. But it showed that Hariri had the Saudi king’s blessings. It reminded me of a Shiite cleric in Ba‘albek, Lebanon, who told me once that Hariri and the Future party were “Wahhabis wearing neckties.” In Lebanon, sectarian tensions can hardly increase any further, both sides hate each other so much and political stances are already extreme. Increasing scrutiny is given to which sect is buying land in which neighborhood. There are rumors that if a Sunni cannot sell his property then Hariri will purchase it so it will not end up in Shiite hands. Thugs on both sides clash regularly. But Shiites are militarily dominant. The Sunni weakness encouraged some Sunnis to look to al-Qaeda for protection. Shiites have historically been the subaltern, and in places like Lebanon, their rise to the middle class has alarmed some Sunnis who prefer to see them return to the south or to cleaning streets. They view Shiites as “uppity,” and forgetting their “place,” as did some Iraqi Sunnis I met in 2003. Shiites are increasingly treated as if they were a separate ethnic group. Pre-existing social disparities and religious antipathies have now crystallized and define everything. This has also led to a Shiite response, which sometimes resembles the justified resentment some African Americans direct at white people. The Shiite sense of being hated has resulted both in increased pride and increased contempt. In Iraq and Lebanon I have encountered a rise in Shiite sectarianism directed at Sunnis, because “they hate us.”

The popular Arab revolutions that spread from Tunisia to Egypt to Yemen and elsewhere shifted the discourse. The rise of Arab nationalism and of secular and leftist opposition movements meant that Arab governments might now also support causes championed by Iran and Hizballah but supported by Arab people, weakening the appeal of Iran and Hizballah. A more independent Turkey, which was Sunni and hostile to Israel also meant there was an alternative to Iran. Now it was the people against their American- and Saudi-backed regimes. The prospect of Arab democracy means that Arab foreign policy will be more independent and less accommodating to Israel, America and Saudi Arabia. The return of Arab nationalism and the prospect of Arab democracy terrifies the Saudi monarchy. This is what it worked to suppress for decades. Moreover, the Saudi religious establishment views Shiites as less than human while politically, Shiites are distrusted.

Rather than Arab Shiites being loyal to Iran, Iran has proven to be a handicap. Iraqi Shiites were crushed in 1991 because Gulf countries and the United States feared they would be loyal to Iran, and today the oppression of the Bahraini opposition is being ignored or supported for the same reason.

Bahraini demonstrators have for years been calling for democracy. Ten years ago they were promised reforms that would transition Bahrain from an absolute monarchy into a constitutional one. But this never happened. Instead discrimination against the majority Shiite population was further entrenched. Over the last ten years demonstrators were met with brutality and the regime hired outside mercenaries from other Arab countries or Pakistan, always Sunni, so they could be relied upon to crush demonstrators mercilessly. In addition to brutally killing and beating opposition demonstrators, the ruling family organized its own demonstration in which tens of thousands of people rallied by a Sunni mosque.

The Gulf Cooperation Council was created in 1981 in response to the Iranian revolution and fears its anti-monarchical winds would blow across the gulf. The GCC’s Peninsula Shield was mostly symbolic and basically disbanded but it was a convenient title for what most recently was effectively the Saudi National Guard invading Bahrain with some police from the UAE to suppress a growing domestic popular uprising. It was clear the Bahrain regime was unable to crush the demonstrators so the Saudis felt compelled to invade. The conflict in Bahrain helped obstruct the revolutionary wave, creating rifts. Sectarianism returned as the dominant theme in the Levant and Gulf, while in North Africa the American-led war on Qadhafi distracted from the people’s revolutions. The Bahrain protestors were met with brutal violence. Because Bahrain is majority Shiite the specter of democracy would mean both the end of a Gulf monarchy, something the Saudis could not tolerate, and even worse, a potential government by Bahraini Shiites. An intense media campaign was launched to delegitimize the demonstrators as working for Iran. Although the protest movements in Bahrain (whose hated Prime Minister has been ruling for forty years) predate the Iranian revolution, the media has succeeded in associating it with Shiites and the regime’s brutal response has succeeded in turning Shiites against it.

And then on March 17 Shiites in Lebanon and Iraq demonstrated in support for their brethren in Bahrain. Suddenly Sunnis could actually point to a “Shiite crescent.” Iraqi Shiites protesting in support of Bahrainis received police protection and support, unlike protestors condemning corruption and lack of services who were met with violence by the Iraqi Security Forces. In Iraq the state is closely identified with the Shiite sect. This is not merely because sectarian Shiite parties dominate it. Government buildings are decorated with Shiite flags, banners and posters and these can be seen even on Iraqi Army and Police vehicles and checkpoints. Not only is there no separation of church and state there is no separation of state and sect. While this is both a symbol of pride and confidence in Iraqi Shiite identity, it must surely make secular Iraqis or non Shiite Iraqis uncomfortable to enter a ministry with Shiite flags on it and Shiite religious channels playing on the television and talk to an official whose mobile phone ring tone is a religious Shiite sermon or song.

For the ruling parties in the Iraqi state backing demonstrations in support of Shiites in Bahrain is a good way to divert the anger of their supporters who might otherwise demonstrate against the human rights abuses, lack of services and corruption in Iraq. Similarly, the ruling Kurdish party backed demonstrations in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Irbil in solidarity with Kurds in Syria as a way to divert attention from anti-government demonstrations elsewhere in Kurdistan.

On 17 March Iraqi MP Haidar al-Mulla proposed that parliament discuss the situation of “our people in Bahrain.” Sunni parliament speaker Osama al-Nujeifi said that peaceful protests were a legitimate right to guarantee the demands of the Bahraini people but the use of violence could “potentially tear apart the social fabric of the country and the region.” He was cautious and did not take a stand on “the sisterly state of Bahrain” specifically. He called for no negative interference in Bahrain’s affairs that could destabilize it unless that interference was beneficial or positive and he called on leaving the people of Bahrain to decide things for themselves.

MP and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja‘fari started slowly and quietly but soon thundered angrily. He described the Saudi invasion as a “flagrant violation.” Arab states were silent during the Sha‘ban intifada of 1991 when the Shiites rose up against Saddam, just as they are in Bahrain’s revolution. But Arab countries condemned violence against the revolutions of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and elsewhere. “Sectarian hatred” explained the silence of Arab countries about the uprising of in Bahrain. Other revolutions were called people’s revolutions but the revolution in Bahrain was called a Shiite uprising and was called sectarian. Al-Ja‘fari asked what was wrong with being Shiite. He was not shy about being Shiite, he said, it was not a danger to anybody. He angrily condemned those who doubted the “Arabness of Shiites.” Shiites were the Shiites, or partisans, of Ali, he said. Where was Ali from, he asked, from Isfahan (in Iran)? No, Ali was from Kufa (Iraq). Shiite Lawmakers immediately applauded his statements. He condemned the Arab world’s cowardly position. He called Pearl square, where Bahrain protestors had gathered, “the pearl of the revolution.” Now was not the time for silence and being shy, he said. He called the Arab world’s position “cowardly.” He compared the dictator of Bahrain to the dictators Mubarak and Qadhafi. “We stood for south Sudan,” he said, and for the Church of Our Lady of Salvation which al-Qaeda attacked in Baghdad, and they could not be quiet for Bahrain. He spoke of the intifada of the martyr Muhammad al-Madhlum, a Sunni air force General from the Duleimi tribe in the ‘Anbar province who was executed in 1995 for allegedly plotting a coup, leading to disturbances among his supporters. Al-Ja‘fari also spoke of Saddam’s crimes in Halabja. He angrily condemned America for its silence on Bahrain. The West had opposed occupations when they were on its territories, why was occupation not allowed in the West but it was allowed in the Arab world?

It was a powerful and eloquent speech, but ironic given that when al-Ja‘fari was Prime Minister the sectarian violence in Iraq intensified and the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Health were controlled by Shiite death squads and Sunnis were killed in hospitals, just as he complained that Shiites in Bahraini hospitals were now being attacked. Other parliament members spoke about the silence of the Arab world during the Kurdish intifada of 1991 and the Sha‘ban intifada in southern Iraq that same year. One speaker also mentioned the Sadrist uprising in 1999 following the assassination of Muhamad Sadiq al-Sadr, father of Muqtada al-Sadr, by alleged Baathist agents. The Arab position was shameful, they said. What was happening in Bahrain was part of the popular intifadas. One speaker compared Arab dictators to dinosaurs. Ahmad Chalabi also condemned what was happening in Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. Female parliamentarians said that the government in Bahrain had lost its legitimacy. Parliament member and former leader of the ministry of interior when it was associated with brutal death squads Bayan Jabr spoke about “our people” being killed in the streets of Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. He spoke about “foreign forces entering Bahrain to kill our people in hospitals … we want Arab league to get out of its silence.” One parliament member spoke of the “intifada of our Arab Muslim people in sisterly Bahrain … We stood with people in Libya, Yemen, Egypt and now with the people of Bahrain.” He also spoke of liberating Palestine, Jerusalem, and Gaza. He condemned governments that did not respect their people and called on severing diplomatic ties with Bahrain.

A Shiite lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi federal police asked me a few days later, “Why are you protecting the demonstrators in Libya but not the demonstrators in Bahrain? Shiites are the majority in Bahrain. What’s wrong with a Shiite government in Bahrain?” While one Shiite taxi driver in Baghdad, while listening to news about Shiites in Bahrain said wistfully, “If Sayyid Muqtada [al-Sadr] gave a fatwa to send two companies of the Mahdi Army to Bahrain, they would liberate them.”

On the afternoon of 17 March there was a government-supported demonstration in Baghdad’s Karada neighborhood. About 100 demonstrators were provided with police escorts who closed the road on their behalf, unlike the police resistance protestors usually face in Iraq. Protestors carried banners stating they were from the “Khafija tribe, Beni Sa’d tribe and the people of Karada.” One banner stated: “The Beni Sa‘d tribe condmens the Saudi intervention that is killing our brothers in Bahrain.” Another stated: “Patience oh Sauds, the Mahdi Muhammad is coming.” And another stated: “Oh infidels oh infidels why are you killing the free ones?”

The next day in Baghdad’s Sadr city, following an angry Friday sermon which addressed the Saudi invasion, calling them “Umayyads,” (referring to the dynasty descended from Mu‘awiya, a figure in Islamic history Shiites revile for usurping the leadership from the descendants of the prophet Muhamad), prayer goers demonstrated nearby. A Bahraini Shiite cleric spoke of Bahraini security forces attacking a nurse. Protestors carried pictures depicting Muqtada al-Sadr in military uniform. “Bahrain will remain steadfast, Sayid Muqtada is victorious,” they shouted. They also chanted, “We are the ones who fought America and we’ll step on the Wahabis and we’ll step on the Saud”; “No no to the Saud”; “How can we sleep at night when we have issues with the Saud?” and “We’ll die before we give up!”

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the Sunni world’s leading clerics and president of the World Federation of Muslim Scholars, who had previously supporting the Egyptian people against Mubarak and had called for Qadhafi to be assassinated, stated that the uprising in Bahrain was different than the other ones in the Arab world because it was sectarian and it did not represent the demands of Bahrainis as one nation. “There is no people’s revolution in Bahrain but a sectarian one,” al-Qaradawi said, “what is happening is not like what has happened in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, but it is the empowerment of some factions via foreign forces on others; thereby it does not include the demands of all of the Bahraini people … the other Arab revolutions, with a common denominator of the oppressed against the oppressor, the Bahraini one is a sectarian, with Shiites against Sunnis.”

Ironically, for someone who supported violence in Palestine and against Qadhafi, he criticized the protests in Bahrain for not being so “peaceful.” It was dangerous, he said, that some Bahraini protestors carried pictures of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei and Lebanon’s Nasrallah (if they were carrying pictures of Saudi king Abdallah he probably would not have criticized them). “They carried Khamenei’s and Nasrallah’s pictures as if they belong to Iran and not Bahrain, after all Bahrain belongs to the GCC, and we need them to show real citizenry.” He then praised the Bahraini ruling family.

On 19 March, Hizballah leader Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah gave a speech expressing his solidarity with the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen. Just before Nasrallah was to give his speech, Arab satellite channels suddenly stopped showing al-Manar, the Hizballah affiliated channel broadcasting it. This was a sign of how regimes feared the power of his speeches. “These are real popular revolutions coming from the people,” he said. After he expressed his support for the popular revolutions against dictatorships throughout the Arab world, Nasrallah concluded with Bahrain. The Bahraini people were “peaceful and longsuffering, oppressed,” he said. They came out to demonstrate peacefully and in a civilized manner for their legitimate rights. Instead the government shot at them, killing and injuring them. He spoke of the paradox that the Arab League and governments did not send their armies to defend Libyan protestors being massacred by Qadhafi but in Bahrain “they sent armies to protect a regime that was not threatened at all.” He compared the Bahraini regime’s tactics to those the Israelis use against Palestinians.

But the greatest injustice, he said, was to sully the sacrificed blood and the oppressed people by calling them sectarian. Nasrallah apologized for using the word Sunni but thanked Sunni scholars and movements who had supported the protests in Bahrain and singled out Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Why were others in the Arab world denouncing the demonstrators in Bahrain, asked Nasrallah. “Is it only because they are Shiites?” he asked, and did that strip them of their human and civil rights? Nobody asked about the religion of Palestinians or the religion of people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya or Yemen. “We stood by them all,” he said. What was the difference between the Khalifas who ruled Bahrain and the house of Mubarak in Egypt or Qadhafi in Libya, he asked.

On March 21st Bahrain’s King Hamad claimed his country has foiled a foreign plot to target Gulf countries. “An external plot has been fomented for 20 to 30 years until the ground was ripe for subversive designs,” he said. “I here announce the failure of the fomented plot.” It was clear he meant that the thousands of Bahraini protestors his forces had crushed were actually Iranian agents and the plot dated back to the Iranian revolution. In Yemen the regime arrested four Shiites on trumped up charges to link them to Iran and prove the false notion that Iran is backing Zeydi rebels. In the ebullient period of the Egyptian revolt, a leading Facebook news group, RNN, or Rasd, trying to be democratic and inclusive, put up a sign of protest against those who considered Shiites as “unfit for civic rights.” and protesting the way the oppression of Bahrainis was justified because they happen to be Shiite. Hundreds of comments disagreed and affirmed that Shiites indeed cannot be considered equal citizens or even human. Throughout the Arab world people are forwarding emailed articles about how Shiites are treacherous and cannot be trusted. One close Shiite friend of mine in Iraq received such an email from an old Sunni friend of his. “Even me?” he wrote back.

An Egyptian-based channel called Safa had a Bahraini flag in its corner with the slogan “God keep Bahrain.” Its host discussed Iranian oppression of Sunnis in that country’s Baluchistan, criticized Iraqi Shiites for oppressing sunnis and then criticized Bahraini Shiites. He warned of “Shiitization” in Egypt and expressed his hopes that Egypt remained 100 percent Sunni. Callers condemned Shiites. The host mocked demonstrators in Bahrain for not being peaceful. A caller blamed Hizballah and Iran. The host called the government of Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki a “collaborator government.”

Similarly, a Saudi owned channel called al-Wesal showed a Sunni rally in Kuwait “in support of our brothers in Bahrain.” A speaker condemned Iran’s repression of its demonstrations and its suppression of demonstrators in Baluchistan, Khuzistan, and Arabistan. “What is called Hizballah,” he said, or the Party of God, was really “Hizb al Shaytan,” or the Party of the Devil. Hizballah had branches in Iraq and Kuwait, he claimed, but it was the same party in all countries. The free Kuwaiti people would not accept to be a follower of Iran. He called for Kuwaiti forces to deploy to Bahrain along side the other forces as soon as possible. Another speaker claimed the GCC liberated Kuwait in 1991. He omitted the role western forces played in that conflict. “We are all Bahraini, he shouted. He warned against whoever threatened overthrowing the state of Bahrain in the name of Iran and spoke of a “Safavid swamp.” He called for the resignation of the Kuwaiti prime minister and spoke of a video showing a car running over a Bahraini policeman. There was a “Safavid plan” that succeeded in Iraq and was taking Yemen via the Houthis (Zeydi tribal rebels). He demanded Kuwaiti armed forces enter Bahrain and defend its institutions. Another speaker called for “victory for our brothers in Bahrain. Its not about reforms its about targeting the regime and state in Bahrain for Safavid reasons. He condemned the Kuwaiti government for being weak and not sending troops into Bahrain. The rally imitated the popular anti-regime protests of the Arab world, with crowds shouting about what the people demand.

Wesal TV had a headline about “showing the mysterious secrets in the religion of the rafida.” It showed the image of a wounded Bahraini policeman and asked, “and who is the terrorist?” It played marshal chants; it showed the Saudi military convoys driving to Bahrain. “Peninsula Shield forces for cleansing the kingdom of Bahrain. “Armies of the free nation,” the chants went, “The Saudis will lead us to victory.” It showed a picture of smiling Saudi soldiers above the slogan “lions of the Sunnis.” The Saudi satellite channel al-Arabiyya juxtaposed footage of Bahraini demonstrators with footage of Nasrallah praising the Iranian leadership as if proving a conspiracy. Even the Washington Post got in on the sectarian game. One article claimed Bahrain was “a Sunni Muslim bulwark against Iranian influence in the Gulf.” It did not explain how a tiny island could be a bulwark against anything. And if Bahrain wasn’t there then Iran would sweep into the Gulf? And what is the threat of Iranian influence exactly?

Kuwait was becoming increasingly divided as well. The Kuwaiti Shiite channel al-Anwar showed Kuwaiti Shiites demonstrating in support of Bahrain, and shouting, among other things, “no to sectarianism!”Serendipitously, the Kuwaitis claimed to have uncovered Iranian spies and the GCC announced investigations into alleged Iranian intervention in the region. It was a good way to tar demonstrators as fifth columnists for Iran.

Meanwhile demonstrations started in Dar‘a, a Syrian border town close to Jordan. Its residents are chicken farmers or else they work in the Gulf. The town has a history of smuggling. Now demonstrations have spread and the government has responded as harshly as others in the region, killing dozens. Sunnis are the majority in Syria and the regime has crushed the Muslim Brotherhood in the past. They spread to other parts of Syria and the regime responded clumsily and brutally, with violence and the usual accusations of foreign conspiracies. While it is not inevitable, it is very possible that a sectarian civil war will break out in Syria, with all the bloodletting of Iraq. I believe it is likely, should the Syrian regime collapse, and almost guaranteed given the regime’s response to demonstrations. In the end, each side in the confrontation will be increasingly identified with a sect, as in Bahrain.

Across the border, Jordan has a very large proportion of Salafis with a strong social base. Many are jihadists and hate Shiites. Jordanian jihadists who had fought in Afghanistan and Iraq told me that they expected the final battle to occur in Sham, historic Syria. I’ve head the same thing from jihadi Salafis in Lebanon and Iraq. They view the ‘Alawite-dominated Syrian regime as a government of infidel Nuseiris. Sectarian Sunnis in Syria would find it easy to smuggle in weapons from Jordan or Lebanon or simply to reverse the smuggling routes into Iraq’s Anbar province. This could lead to tensions with Hizballah in Lebanon and with the regime in Iraq. Civil war in Syria will spread to Lebanon. Syria is home to both important Sunni and Shiite holy places. Leading Sunni cleric al-Qaradawi gave a sermon on 25 March condemning a Syrian raid on a mosque, which killed opposition demonstrators. The Syrian people treated ‘Alawite Syrian President Asad like he was a Sunni, al-Qaradawi said, but Asad was a prisoner of his entourage and his sect. The ‘Alawite sect controls the government and security forces, Qaradawi added.

The Syrian regime still has means in its disposal to placate demonstrators and control the disparate opposition groups. It has released prisoners, including Islamists, and initiated reforms. And holding back a civil war in Syria might be the knowledge, on all sides, of how bloody it could get. But so far the revolutions have proven impossible to stop, and in Syria it may be impossible to halt the sectarian dynamic that will ensue.

Increasingly even secular Arab Sunnis have adopted the extremist Wahabi views of Shiites. Coexistence is becoming impossible. And when the confrontation happens then the intolerant schools of Islam, such as the Salafis and Wahhabis, will dominate and become the universal Sunni vision of Shiites. Sunnis and Shiites alike are thinking of the conflict more and more as a regional one, with national borders meaning less. There is more violence to come.

On 29 March on the Sawt al-Iraq radio station I heard the following song, sung to the tune of Shiite religious lamentations:

“Shiites of Bahrain we are all with you

When you visit Hussein on the day of Karbala’

Hussein will come out of his grave to salute you

Iraq from the sea is supporting you

As long as time separates us

We are united with you as Shiites

If the Shiite wants to choose life

He becomes a statue of destiny and struggle

Shiites are brothers for the sake of the nation

We are not afraid of death

In Haidar we secure ourselves

We are the tested sword in your right hand

The right has to cut the hypocrisy

The sound comes from Iraq, Shiites of Bahrain we are all with you.”

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This entry was posted in Background & Analysis, Bahrain, Events, Human Rights, Imperialism, Imperialist Interference & Views, Libya, Military, Revolution, Saudi Arabia, Yemen. Bookmark the permalink.

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